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DUTIES TO ANIMALS:
ANIMALS:�
RAWLS' ALLEGED DI LEMMA
LEMMA�
In his spirited paper, "Duties to
Animals:
Rawls'
Dilemma,"l,
Tom
Regan accuses Rawls of a fundamental
equivocation in his moral attitude
toward animals.
Regan contends that
while Rawls recognizes a natural duty
not to be cruel to animals, he simulta
neously holds that only people are
owed the natural duties of justice.
But if being a person is necessary
condition for receiving the duties of
justice, Regan asks, why isn't it like
wise a decisive consideration for
determining entitlement to the natural
duty of not being harmed?
Rawls,
Regan argues, is faced with the fol
lowing dilemma: either being a moral
person is a "decisive consideration for
determining those to whom we have
natural duties, "2 or it is not. If the
former, then Rawls fails to account
for the acknowledged natural duty not
to harn animals; but if the latter,
Rawls has no grounds for denying
animals the protection of any of the
other natural duties of justice. Regan
considers several possible replies that
might lift Rawls off the horns of this
purported dilemma, but finds each of
them lacking.
He concludes that
Rawls can avoid his pointy perch only
by abandoning either the natural duty
not to be cruel to animals, or else the
claim that moral personal ity is the
basis of entitlement to the natu ral
duties of justice.
Regan argues, of
cou rse, for the latter.
Justice as
fairness, he suggests, has been nei
ther just nor fair to animals. They
have been arbitrarily excluded from
the protection of Rawls' principles of
justice.
Regan's critique, however, is itself
u nfai r to Rawls.
Regan misi nterprets
a central aspect of Rawls' theory and
then
finds
the
resulting
views
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contradictory.
Indeed they are. But
they are not Rawls' views! In the fol
lowing comments, I shall therefore
state what I take to be Regan's mis
reading of Rawls' statements on the
rights of animals, and show how a
clarification of Rawls' views eliminates
any appearance of self-contradiction.
, shall also briefly go beyond the
question of the internal consistency of
~ Jh~2.D:/_ 91 Justice and suggest the
way in which a Kantian theory, such
as Rawls', might account for some of
the rights of animals which Regan is
so eager to defend.
For I suspect
that such an extension of a contracta
rian theory of justice may prove more
congenial to Regan's own views than
does the utilitarianism of Peter Singer
and other out-spoken defenders of
animal rights.

Regan's basic argument contends
that Rawls inconsistently makes the
following claims:
(1) We have a natural duty not to
be cruel to a'limals;
(2) We do not have a natu ral duty
of justice to animals, because the duty
of justice is owed only to persons;
indeed,
(3) All natural duties are due only
to persons.
(1) and '(3) are obviously inconsis
tent.
But although (2) and (3) are
plausible interpretations
of
Rawls'
views,3 (1) is not.
Rawls does not,
to my knowledg~ ever hold that we
have a natural duty of non-cruelty to
animals. To see this, let us cursorily
review his account of such duties.
Recall, fi rst of all, that Rawls is
developing a theory of justice, which
in his view is a set of principles
"assigning rights and duties in the
basic institutions of society" and
which "define the appropriate distri
bution of the benefits and burdens of
social cooperation" (p. 4).4 Rawls fur
ther assumes that he is giving a
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theory for a "well-ordered society, "
that is, a "society in which (1)
everyone accepts and knows that the
others accept the same principles of
justice, and (2) the basic social insti
tutions generally satisfy and are gen
erally known to satisfy these princi
pies" (p. 5). Finally, Rawls assumes
a certain conception of the persons
that inhabit this well-ordered society.
He characterizes them as
"free,"
"equal," and rational beings (pp.
11-13, and 241-57), and as "moral
persons," agents capable of having a
conception of their good (as expressed
by a rational plan of life) and who are
"capable of having (and are assumed
to acquire) a sense of justice, a nor
mally effective desire to apply and to
act upon the principles of justice" (p.
505). Throughout A Theory of J~
tice, Rawls insists that the key fea
tures of his theory, especially the
central theoretical construction of the
original
position,
are
explicitly
designed to represent or to model this
account of the role of the principles
of justice in a just society and his
particular conce~tion of the human
beings who a re its subjects. 5
The
principles of justice are therefore cho
sen by theoretically defined beings,
rational agents
who are carefully
characterized to incorporate aspects of
a specific conception of a liberal soci
ety and its citizens.
Given this account of the principles
of social justice, it is not surprising
that the selection of the principles of
justice for individuals is similarly con
strained.
As part of his overall
theory of justice, Rawls specifies two
groups of principles for individuals,
the "obligations of fairness" and the
so-called "natural duties." Only the
latter is of concern to us now.
The
"natu ral
duties"
are those
moral
requi rements
which
it
would
be
rational for the parties in the original
position to impose on all persons,
irrespective of their volUntary acts
and
their
other
institutional
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obligations. But given thei r fu nction
and their theoretical derivation, the
natural
duties
are
necessarily
extended
only
to
rational
moral
agents; "they obtain between all as
equal moral persons" (p. 115).
The
argument of sec. 51, for example,
attempts to derive the duty to support
and further just institutions merely
from the nature of the persons in the
original position and their desire to
establish a well-ordered society (p.
334).
Rawls similarly argues for the
natural duties of mutual respect and
mutual aid on the ground that they
are required for our assumed concep
tion of the person as a moral being
(pp. 337-9).
Even the discussion of
sec. 19, which lists the natural duty
not to inflict unnecessary suffering,
explicitly links natural duties with the
notion of the equality of moral per
sonhood and the representation of that
idea in its derivation from the original
position (pp. 114-5).
Nowhere is
there any suggestion that we have
any natural duty to any non-human
being, nor couJs! such ~ suggestion
ma ke ~ sense gi'en Rawls general
account of the principles of justice for
I

individua~s.

Why then does Regan attribute (1)
to Rawls? Apparently, his entire case
rests on the single paragraph in
which Rawls notes that "certainly it is
wrong to be cruel to animals," and
that animals' capacities for "feelings of
pleasure and pain and for the forms
of life of which <they> are capable
clearly impose duties of compassion
and humanity" (p. 512).
But the
whole point of that paragraph (which
Regan acknowledges in passing) is to
state that any such duties are "out
side the scope of the theory of jus
tice."
All that has preceded in A
Iheory of Justice, especially the sec-:
77 account of moral personality as the
"decisive consideration"
determining
entitlement to considerations of j us
tice, is part of Rawls' theory of jus
tice.
Moreover, the sees. 19 and 51
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discussions of the principles for indi
viduals, wh ich specify the natu ral
duties, are also explicitly included as
parts of that theory (e.g. pp. 108,
However, "our con
116, and 333).
duct toward animals," Rawls insists,
"is not regulated by these principles"
(p. 504).
Regan has
apparently
equated Rawls' statement that we do
have some duty of non-cruelty to ani
mals (due to some broad moral or
metaphysical view that goes beyond a
theory of justice and about which he
refuses to speculate) with the claim
that persons have a .r:!-i!tl.!~ du!y not
to ha I'm each other.
Si nce Rawls
explicitly denies that these two ideas
should be equated, and since there is
nothing in his writings that commits
him to their equivalence, I conclude
that Regan wrongly attributes (1) to
Rawls.
Therefore,
we
need
not
believe that there is anything contra
dictory in Rawls' views on natural
duties and the rights of animals.
II
In th(; middle part of his paper,
Regan
discusses three
replies
to
Rawls' pu rported dilemma (though he
su rprisi ngly
doesn't
consider
the
reply wh ich simply shows that Rawls
does not hold each of the contradic
tory positions attributed to him).
In
the course of considering (and reject
ing) these replies, Regan misreads
Rawls' theory in a way which illumi
nates his basic problem with the text.
I shall therefore briefly comment on a
couple of his arguments.
One rejected suggestion is that
animals are denied the protection of
the principles of
justice because
Rawls' hypothetical contractors know
that they won 't be an imals and there
fore have no interest in providing
protection for them. In his considera
tion of this suggestion, Regan argues
that it is illegitimate to specify that
the contractors know that they are
and will continue to be human beings,
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for this, he contends would arbitrarily
prejudice the outcome of their deliber
ations in favor of one species, and
thus run "counter to what the 'veil of
ignorance' is
supposed to accom
plish." 6
But Regan here misinter
prets the primary function of the veil
of ignorance, for its basic role is not
to guarantee the impartiality of the
chosen principles, but rather to theo
retically
represent certain
Kantian
notions concerning the nature of moral
principles and agents.
In particular
it is designed to model the Kantian
idea of a categorical imperative, a
principle that would be autonomously
chosen by free and equal rational
be!ngs who merely regard themselves
as such and who seek to express that
natu re in thei I' choices.
Th us, the
function of the "veil-of-ignorance" is
to insure that "the parties are not to
be influenced by any particular infor
mation that is not pa rt of thei I' . rep re
sentation as free moral persons with a
determinate (but unknown) conception
of the good." 7
Regan's contention
that the parties in the original posi
tion should wei~h the possibility that
they might be (or actually are) ani
mals significantly misinterprets this
most fundamental aspect of Rawls'
thought.
Regan does anticipate an objection
"that the supposition that any person
in the original position could becme a
non-human animal would render the
very point of the original position
incoherent. "8 The argument given in
support of this claim is not, however,
the one just adduced. Regan's imagi
nary interlocutor observes that the
principles of justice serve to govern
the distribution of harms and benefits
to those who are possible beneficiar
ies, that is, beings capable of being
helped or harmed or of having a good
or bad life. Since animals presumably
are incapable of such individual wel
fare, they are not fit subjects for the
principles of justice.
Regan has, I
believe,
a
telling
reply
to this
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argument.
Since many "higher ani
mals" clearly have desi res and prefer
ences, memories and beliefs, and since
they obviously have a psychophysical
identity over time, it makes perfectly
good sense to speak of them faring ill
or well and consequently of having a
good or bad life.
But Regan's dis
cussion is once again inadequate as a
critique of Rawls' understanding of
the nature an-a--purpose of the original
position. S
The purpose of· his con
tractors is not simply to fu rther thei I'
own well-being, but rather to estab
lish a mode of existence that best
expresses and preserves thei r natu re
as free and equal rational beings.
Since such moral persons are, by def
inition, those who can have a sense of
justice and who are capable of formu
lating and revising a rational plan of
life, it makes no sense to entertain
the thought of parties in the original
position who are not rational beings.
III
Rawls' theory of justice, as I have
defended it, is based on a particular
conception of the moral agent.
Such
a being must have the potential for
acting from a sense-of-justice and
must be capable of formulating and
pursuing a rational life plan.
The
scope of the protection of the princi
ples of justice is therefore necessarily
limited to rational moral agents.
But
need such beings be limited to human
beings?
Couldn't some of Regan's
"higher animals" minimally qualify as
rational beings of the requisite sort,
such that they would be directly enti
tled to the protection of all of the
principles of justice?
I do not see
why not.
Suppose that we were to learn that
dolphins, for example, have a sense
of their own identity, have a concep
tion of their own good, recognize and
act from general principles of mutually
advantageous social behavior, and so
on.
(Such
speculation
is
not
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implausible given the actual recorded
behavior of these mammals.)
They
might even have a higher-order inter
est in primary goods, such as liberty,
which they recognize as a necessary
means for achieving their more partic
ular desires. Were these claims shown
to be the case, a Rawlsian-Kantian
view would necessarily extend the
principles of justice to cover these
animals, for there would no longer be
any non-arbitrary way to exclude
them from the original position. Thei r
unusual bodies, strange language, and
peculiar conceptions of the good would
be just as morally irrelevant as the
racial, linguistic,
and idiosyncratic
behavioral differences amongst human
bei ngs.
Moreover, even if for some
reason the dolphins could not press
their claims to just treatment (due
perhaps to their linguistic deficien
cies), human agents would have natu
ral duties to respect and protect their
rights, just as we now owe these
duties to infants and the temporarily
verbally incapacitated.
I conclude with the suggestion that
considerations similar to the ones just
mentioned may account for Regan's
intuitions concerning our duties to the
higher animals, though unfortunately
he stresses the
animals' abilities
merely to have "good lives" rather
than
their similarities to
rational
agents.
I suspect, however, though
unfortunately I cannot pursue the idea
further in the present paper, that
extending this line of argument (by,
for example, showing that higher ani
mals differ from human beings only in
the degree to which they are moral
agents in the Kantian sense) would
better support whatever rights are
properly attributable to animals than
would any kind of
utilitarianism.
Regan himself has effectively shown
the defects of the latter view.
I
therefore urge him to turn his consid
erable philosophical talents to a more
sympathetic and fai I' treatment of the
contractarian tradition.
Alan E. Fuchs
College of William and Mary

E&A

11/4
NOTES

lThis journal, pp. 76-82.
2Regan, p. 77.
3These characterizations of Rawls'
positions purposely oversimplify his
views so as to make Regan's point as
strong as possible. We should note,
however, (as Regan himself concedes)
that in A Theor~ 2f )~~.!ice Rawls
rega rds the capacity for moral person
personaity only as a sufficient condition for
receiving justice.
"Whether moral
personality is also a necessary condi
condition I shall leave aside (p. 506)."
Nevertheless, I will follow Regan in
treati ng it as a necessa ry condition,
or, as he frequently states it, the
"decisive consideration."
Similarly I
shall
ignore
Regan's
distinction
between Rawls' "strong" and "weak"
positions, since if Rawls can be
defended while holding the stronger
thesis, he is surely exculpated on the
weaker view as well.
4Rawls, A The~ of )ustts:e (Cam(Cam
bridge:
Harvard University Press,
1971).
Page references in the text
are to this edition.
sThis
argument IS
even
more
explicitly developed in Rawls' recent
articles,
particularly his
"Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory," The
Journal of Philbsophy LXXVII (1980),
pp. 516-517, 520-522, and 525.
See
also my "Fairness to Justice as Fair
Fairness," in H. Miller and W. Williams,
eds., The Limits of Utilitarianism
(Min neapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1982).
6 Regan,
p. 78.
7 Rawls,
"Kantian Constructivism,"
p. 459.
See also A Theory of ~_ustice, sec. 40
--SRegan, p. 78.
9Here, as throughout my note, I
am merely considering Regan's criti
criticism of Rawls as internally contradic
contradictory.
It suffices, therefore, to show
that Regan has misinterpreted Rawls.
I do not contend that Regan may not
have independent reasons for rejecting
Rawls' views on duties to animals.
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